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ABSTRACT
Thousands of rural landowners in New York State have joined together to form grassroots organizations
aimed at collectively bargaining with natural gas companies. The leverage afforded by acting collectively allows
these landowner coalitions to potentially influence the economic, environmental, and community impacts of
gas development across hundreds of thousands of acres. In-depth interviews with coalition leaders conducted
for this article reveal the scope, motivations, and benefits of membership in these groups. Our work examines
these elements using multiple frameworks for understanding collective natural resource management. The
coalitions are primarily concerned with the advancement of private member benefits, while public benefits of
the collective action are poised to accrue indirectly. Group leaders are also contemplating how to use their
leverage to secure direct benefits for the wider community – actions that may give communities a modicum of
local control over gas development.

New types of energy development emerging across the rural United States –
such as wind, unconventional natural gas, and biofuels – primarily depend on large
swaths of contiguous land that is often owned by many individual landowners
(Franklin et al. 2010). The potential for collective action among these landowners
during the development process offers an array of implications for rural
communities, environmental landscapes, and domestic energy production. Along
the southern border of central New York State, in an area known as the Southern
Tier Region, rural landowners have formed grassroots organizations aimed at
collectively bargaining with natural gas companies over the terms of development
leases in the Marcellus Shale natural gas formation. As of early 2011, these
organizations – calling themselves landowner coalitions – have grown to claim
more than 800,000 acres of rural landscape owned by more than 20,000 landownermembers, a sum that equals more than 20 percent of the land within this region
(JLCNY 2010).
With the initial goal of securing financial benefits for their members, these
coalitions – largely consisting of, and voluntarily led by, rural landowners – have
62
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inadvertently become the de facto managers of natural resource development across
vast and largely contiguous landscape scales. Besides setting rates of compensation,
the leases these groups negotiate with energy companies serve as legally-binding
operating agreements that can influence environmental and community outcomes.
The traditional practice is for representatives (called landmen) from one or more
energy companies to approach individual landowners in a “seller beware”
transaction where the landowner is typically the less knowledgeable party (NYSAG
2008). The coalition phenomenon, in contrast, offers the prospect of increased
landowner agency by turning this process into a much more uniform action that is
centrally negotiated and managed by groups of local landowners.
This article describes the organization and emergence of these landowner
coalitions in New York State and interprets them using existing frameworks of
collective natural resource management. Although coalitions or associations are
known to exist in other natural gas development areas such as Texas or
Pennsylvania (Smith 2010), the landowner coalition movement in New York –
while still very new – appears to be much larger and better organized. In 2008,
pending a supplement to the existing New York State Generic Environmental
Impact Statement (GEIS) for natural gas drilling, state regulators suspended
critical natural gas development activities in the Marcellus Shale formation during
the very height of land speculation and drilling interest (Office of the Governor,
State of New York 2008). While drilling has increased dramatically in neighboring
Pennsylvania, the stop in development in New York caused by the review has
provided an opportunity for the coming-together and evolution of these groups.
The vast acreages and higher economic stakes associated with the Marcellus Shale
have helped to make collective negotiation an attractive option for landowners and
the regulatory “time-out” has allowed some of these groups to transform into
organized institutions aimed at providing landowner education and agency, political
advocacy, and environmental management. Although uncertainty remains, state
regulators expect the review to be completed and drilling permits to be issued again
sometime in 2011 (Goldberg 2010).
Importantly, landowner coalition groups are operating in a local-level power
vacuum. New York State has a long tradition of home rule that empowers municipal
decision making; however, it is similar to other states in that it exempts such local
authority in the case of oil and natural gas development (New York State 2010). As
in many states, local municipalities in New York lack the capacity to exclude gas
development though local land use regulations, and therefore lack the capacity to
gain economic, social, and ecological concessions from energy firms (Kenneally and
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Mathes 2010). Previous research into energy-impacted communities has shown that
local municipalities are often required to provide a rapidly increased level of
infrastructure and services during development phases while new sources of
revenue are not equal to these costs (Gilmore 1976; Markussen 1978; Jacquet 2009).
Through local ordinance, or the leverage afforded by large landowners,
communities in other energy contexts have sometimes been successful in
negotiating with energy developers for public socioeconomic and environmental
benefits, such as school and police facilities construction (OIA 1988), per-well
payments to environmental mitigation funds (USDOI 2008), pace of development
controls (Butler and Nelson 1994), and economic compensation (Peelle 1978). Some
leaders have looked to the contractual leverage provided by the sheer scale of
landowner coalitions as a proxy to municipal or community-based regulation of
natural resource development, as the groups may hold the potential to exert greater
influence over development than state regulators or local municipalities.
COLLECTIVE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORKS
The use of collective action to economically leverage private natural resource
development is certainly not new, and well-known examples include agricultural
cooperatives (Knapp 1963), forest cooperatives (Kittredge 2005; Wolf and HufnaglEichiner 2007), and common pool natural resource management organizations
(Ostrom 1990). Several similarities between the landowner coalitions and forestry
or agricultural cooperatives can be identified; the most critical of which – building
from Olson (1965) – emphasizes the maximization of the individual outcomes of
members, rather than a focus on the improvement of public goods. However, as
with cooperatives, public goods may still emerge from the process, despite intent.
Emerging landowner coalition traits can also be compared with a framework of
community-based natural resource management (CBRM). Much has been written
and debated regarding the emergence and effectiveness of CBRM in the United
States and abroad, with examples ranging from community forests to collective
watershed management (Baker and Kusel 2003; Griffin 1999; Kellert et al. 2000;
Stedman et al. 2009). CBRM is useful in this analysis as it offers a cooperative
resource management framework that clearly moves beyond strictly “membersonly” benefits to provide benefits for the public-at-large; but how the current and
future activities and goals of the New York State landowner coalitions fit within a
CBRM framework is as unclear as it is intriguing.
While case studies of collective action to manage natural resource development
continue to accumulate, a paucity of analysis has been noted regarding collective
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action that involves disparate actors across landscape-scales (Goldman, Thompson,
and Daily 2007; Meinzen-Dick, DiGregorio, and McCarthy 2004; Poteete and
Ostrom 2004). We utilize the provision of public goods in addition to member
benefits as a potential bridge between a strict cooperative model and a CBRM
framework. Specifically, our research examines: (1) the purposeful action toward
public benefits by the coalitions; (2) the accruement of public benefits as an
unintentional byproduct of their actions; and (3) the potential for progressive
unfolding/expansion of these larger benefits over time. This article does not argue
the merits of natural gas drilling, but it does indirectly compare the prospect of
wide-scale natural gas development organized collectively by landowner coalitions
to the scenario of wide-scale natural gas development that is privately negotiated
with individual landowners.
THE MARCELLUS SHALE AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT IN NEW
YORK STATE
The Marcellus Shale is a massive Devonian period sedimentary rock formation
that stretches across the mid-Atlantic region from northern West Virginia though
much of Pennsylvania and into the Southern Tier of New York State (see Figure
1) (Soeder and Kappel 2009). It is called an unconventional shale play – similar to
the Barnett Shale in Texas or the Haynesville Shale in Louisiana—as the gas is
trapped in microscopic pores within the formation instead of in a large gas pool as
is found in “conventional” gas development. To exploit the small pores of gas, the
well bore is drilled horizontally underground for a distance of several thousand feet
and a mixture containing millions of gallons of water, sand, and chemicals is
pumped at an extremely high pressure into the formation (a process called
hydrofracturing) to create artificial fractures that connect these microscopic gasbearing pores and allow the gas to flow though the well and up to the surface
(Soeder and Kappel 2009). To fracture the maximum amount of shale formation,
several horizontally-drilled wells can be drilled from a single surface location, and
the well bores are methodically placed so that an underground carpet of well bores
and fractures perforate a large portion of the formation. This technique, when
compared with traditional extraction techniques, has been viewed as more akin to
a manufacturing process (Farey 2010). While these advancements in well drilling
and stimulation techniques have led to a reclassification of unconventional shale
formations such as the Marcellus as economically recoverable, the array of
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FIGURE 1. THE MARCELLUS SHALE REGION . FIGURE BY JEFFREY JACQUET .
horizontal wells presents a logistical challenge that requires obtaining subsurface
drilling rights from many different property owners.
The high natural gas commodity prices of the mid 2000s and revised geological
estimates of the total amount of recoverable gas in the Marcellus Shale have further
incentivized development. Some estimates have predicted as much as 500 trillion
cubic feet of recoverable natural gas in the Marcellus Shale, which would place the
field among the largest on the planet (Englander 2009; Greico 2008). Much of the
gas company interest has recently centered on a geologically attractive central
swath of Pennsylvania called “the fairway” which reaches into the Southern Tier of
New York State. While development of the Marcellus Shale began in West Virginia
and southwest Pennsylvania as early as 2003, interest in developing the resource
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in the fairway areas of northern Pennsylvania and New York State did not
materialize until late 2007 (Harper 2008).
New York State has a long history of natural gas development, as the first
commercial natural gas well was developed in 1825 in Fredonia, NY and gas
storage operations exist along the southern border of the state (NYSERDA 2010).
Several conventional natural gas fields have been developed in New York over the
last 185 years and in 2008 there were more than 13,000 active wells that produced
more than 50 billion cubic feet of natural gas (NYDEC 2010a; 2010b). However, the
vast majority of this development was small in scale and intensity, and the wells
were conventionally drilled and operated by locally-owned energy firms that paid
modest royalties and leasing bonuses. This historical drilling activity has largely
occurred in areas not currently facing Marcellus Shale development, although
leasing activity has been commonplace throughout the Southern Tier for decades.
Much of this leasing activity was highly speculative in nature, performed before
development of the Marcellus Shale was thought to be feasible, and thus was
negotiated for very low rates of compensation. An analysis of publically available
information found that between 40 and 60 percent of land in the Southern Tier has
been leased; however, given that the term of a lease is typically five years in
duration and little new leasing has occurred since 2008, most leases will have
reached expiration within the next few years (MAPTC 2011).
In contrast to historical activity, the Marcellus Shale offers the prospect of large
national and international energy firms conducting intensive and industrial modern
natural gas development across large swaths of southern New York. Such
development can give landowners much larger leasing and royalty payments than
previously received from conventional gas drilling, as well as the potential for much
larger-scale environmental and community disruptions.
COLLECTIVE NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
The Cooperative Model
The economic and ecological benefits of coordinated forest management among
smaller private landowners have long been espoused by foresters and other
landscape managers in the United States (Stoddard 1961; 1964). However, despite
wide-scale implementation among forest owners in other countries, the practice is
not widespread within the United States (Kittridge 2005). However, there has been
an increased interest in coordinated forestry in recent years, and case studies
highlight functional forestry cooperatives (Schulte, Rickenbach, and Merrick 2008).
The now-defunct Sustainable Woods Cooperative – a venture in southwestern
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Wisconsin that leveraged the local cooperation of more than 150 landowners for
favorable harvesting practices and the cooperative ownership of lumber production
facilities – is among the high profile examples (Gaskill 2003).
We view forest cooperatives as perhaps more analogous to the landowner
coalitions than agricultural cooperatives given the forest cooperatives’ often
informal organizational structures and focus on natural resource extraction. The
inhomogeneous organizational structures of the forest cooperatives can range from
loose alliances of volunteer landowners that do little more than coordinate timber
sales to formally staffed organizations that centrally produce and market upscale
timber products (Gass et al. 2008; Klosowski et al. 2001). Moreover, the
motivations of these groups can range from pure economic leverage, to strict
ecological conservation, to the social benefits produced through community
interaction (Rickenbach 2006a).
However, it has been noted that the vast majority of forest cooperatives are
fundamentally businesses (Rickenbach 2006b:27), formed to advance the outcome
of individual members and not the benefit of common goods or society as a whole
(Tiles et al. 2004). Rickenbach (2006a) succinctly noted “(c)ooperatives are effective
when they meet the needs of the members,” and as such, membership in these forest
cooperatives is reserved to the property owners, and community benefits are left to
accrue only indirectly. The community benefits of the larger cooperative model
have been noted, including the benefit of increased social capital (Merrett and
Walzer 2004), and the retention of value-added business in the local community
(Fulton and Anderson 2001). Nadeau and Wilson (2001) show that cooperative
ventures can be effective in producing social and economic benefits to the larger
community, although these benefits typically accrue as a byproduct of increasing
benefits to cooperative members.
Community-based Resource Management
CBRM has emerged in recent years in a spate of great enthusiasm around the
potential for locally-based management of forests (Baker and Kusel 2003), wildlife
(Agrawal and Gibson 1999), and fisheries (Hviding and Baines 2008). Although
Bradshaw (2003) has sounded some crucial cautionary notes, based on the
credibility and capacity of communities to effectively manage their own resources,
the general tide of management strategy has been toward the greater devolution of
state power to the local level. Kellert et al. (2000) offered several core principles of
CBRM. Briefly, these emphasize greater involvement of local community members
in decision making and the devolution of power from more centralized authorities.
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CBRM also involves the joint consideration of environmental and socioeconomic
objectives and outcomes. Finally, CBRM emphasizes local knowledge and tradition,
as expressed (for example) in local property rights and traditional values.
The success or failure of CBRM is based on, according to Kellert et al. (2000),
the equitable distribution of benefits across a wide range of community members
and the empowerment of community members (including the ability to effectively
engage in conflict resolution and increased production and widespread distribution
of knowledge and more sustainable use of resources). In our case, the existence of
a community-level power vacuum, as described earlier, matters a great deal; as
communities are unable to invoke the powers of home rule to either exclude all
together or dictate the terms of leasing arrangements, the possibility increases that
these groups of individual landowners may serve as one of the very few available
avenues of community control over this resource development.
PROJECT LOCATION
The Southern Tier region of New York is located just north of Pennsylvania,
part of the High Allegheny Plateau consisting of rolling hills and valleys primarily
forested (more than 65 percent) with mixed hardwoods (NYSDEC 2006). Like much
of the northeastern United States, the area is experiencing a trend of afforestation
as agricultural use declines (NYSDEC 2010c). New York State has recognized the
Southern Tier region as important for its biological diversity, especially regarding
small-acreage wetlands, forests, and habitat for a broad range of taxa, and has
identified large-scale forest management planning to be one of the biggest
challenges facing the ecology of the region (NYSDEC 2006).
The Southern Tier is often considered part of the post-industrial Rust Belt, and
has largely suffered from poor economic conditions during the latter half of the
twentieth century (Thomas and Smith 2009). The region is known for its high
levels of population loss among the already struggling northeast United States
(McGranahan and Beale 2002). It typically rates below average regarding economic
indicators such as rates of employment and Gross Domestic Product (NYSCAA
2010; Abel and Dietz 2008). The U.S. Census Bureau (2010) estimates the
population of the eight Southern Tier counties studied in this paper (see Figure 2)
to have decreased by nearly 31,000 residents, or about 6 percent, between 1990 and
2009. The region also contains one of the highest percentages of elderly persons in
the United States, with persons aged 65 or older comprising 30 percent of the
population in Broome County (He et al. 2005).
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FIGURE 2. THE SOUTHERN TIER REGION OF NEW YORK, WITH THE COUNTIES
THAT CONTAIN LANDOWNER COALITIONS EXPLORED IN THIS STUDY .
CREATED BY JEFFREY JACQUET .
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In this research, a primary goal was to obtain a better characterization of the
coalition phenomenon, including the time lines of emergence, the numbers of
organizations, membership and organizational attributes, and the sizes of acreages
held. Our overarching inquiry considers the possibility of landowner coalitions as
moving from a model that emphasizes member benefits to one that attempts to gain
benefits for the public at large. Specifically, we asked three sets of questions:
•
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“for whom” are these benefits intended? Does the “community” only include
members of the coalition? How are these boundaries related to the particular
outcomes being considered?
A second set of questions involves the potential for indirect benefits.
•

Do we have the sense that—regardless of intent—there are indirect community
benefits of these lease negotiations? As with above, we ask which sorts of
outcomes are most likely and for whom?

Thirdly, we engage the prospect of change over time:
•

What do we envision as the future of these groups? If certain outcomes are not
currently being realized, may these groups move to realize them in the future?
What are the barriers and opportunities for such movement to occur?

METHODOLOGY
In the spring of 2010, we performed interviews with the principal organizers or
leaders of each of the twelve larger or more active landowner coalitions in the state.
In addition, a small focus group was performed with four leaders of two lateemerging coalitions that were starting to organize by mid-2010. The interview
subjects were selected to represent the entire geographical area broadly (each of the
eight counties considered in this study were represented by at least one interview
subject). Most of the interview subjects were retired or semi-retired landowners
with a long history of residence in the area, although two of the interview subjects
were agricultural or county educators, and one subject was a legal consultant
working with several coalitions. Given the emergent nature of the coalitions – and
our focus on organizational history and goals – we determined that coalition leaders
and/or organizers were best suited to provide these data, as they had been present
since the beginning of the group organization and participate in nearly all group
activities. Sixteen participants represented the leadership of nearly all of the largest
coalitions in New York State.
All of the interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed, and each was
between approximately 45 minutes and 2 hours in length. They were semistructured, based on an interview protocol created to reflect the research questions
above, focusing on the time lines, motivations, outcomes, and organizational
structures of the coalitions and their members. Additional questions were asked
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about how the role and goals of the coalitions may change though time, the role the
coalitions play in the larger community, and lessons learned from the organizational
process. A cross-case analysis of the transcript data was performed, and from these
major categories of discussion, themes and sub-themes were identified and
organized into a spreadsheet, and quotes that best represented the breadth and
character of these data were culled from the transcripts (Fontana and Frey 2000).1
RESULTS
Scope of the Coalition Phenomenon
According to coalition websites and other promotional material, at least 35
coalitions exist in the Southern Tier of New York State. In aggregate, these
coalitions claim more than 800,000 acres of land owned by more than 20,000
property owners, or an area equal equivalent to approximately 1,125 square miles
(JLCNY 2010). By comparison, the entire area of the eight-county region in which
they operate is 5,762 square miles, while the approximate area inside that region
considered viable for gas drilling may be closer to 3,700 square miles. As such, these
coalitions exert considerable influence over a substantial portion of the terrain
considered attractive to gas drilling. Through the interviews, the leaders indicated
that these figures generally represent landowners who have provided detailed
parcel, lease, and contact information to the coalition, but are under no obligation
to sign a lease negotiated by the coalition. One coalition leader described this
affiliation as “in orbit around the coalition,” while many more untallied landowners
are taking a “wait and see” approach to membership (Martin).
The size, scope, and structure of these groups can range widely (see Table 1).
The two largest coalitions are informal and volunteer-led organizations found in
Steuben and Tioga Counties, claiming approximately 162,000 acres owned by 5,000
owners and 113,000 acres owned by 1,700 owners, respectively (SCLC 2010; TCLG
2010). Both groups have a leader or spokesperson and a central committee of
volunteers that coordinates membership and activities. On the other end of the
spectrum, some coalitions are formed by a handful of neighboring property owners
owning a few hundred acres or by an entrepreneurial local attorney or leasing
consultant who is typically paid a per-acre fee upon successful negotiation. Most of
the organizations are somewhere between these extremes, with many comprising
informal organizations representing tens of thousands of largely contiguous acres.

1

W e have attached a pseudonym to the end of each quotation to aid the reader in differentiating

the source of the quotation while preserving the anonymity of interviewees.
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Except for one group organized by a leasing consultant, all of the groups
represented by our interview subjects were organized and are run by a committee
of volunteers. Yet all are affiliated with an attorney or leasing consultant who
performs the legal paperwork and negotiates the leasing terms with the energy
company for the members. These coalitions require no fee to join, but will require
a relatively small per-acre fee to offset the legal costs upon signing a lease with an
energy company.
TABLE 1. LANDOWNER COALITIONS REPRESENTED BY INTERVIEW SUBJECTS
MEM .
MEM .
YEAR
LEASE
NAME
COUNTY
HHS
ACRES
FORMED
SGD *
Steuben County
Coalition. ..................... Steuben
5,000a
164,000a
2008c
No
Tioga Landowners
Group. ..........................
Tioga
1,600+b 120,300b
2008c
No
Chemung County
Coalition. ..................... Chemung 1,000+c
80,000c
2008c
No
Windsor Coalition..... Broome
NDf
80,000c
2008c
Partial
Broome;
Deposit Coalition....... Delaware
300d
37,000d
2008c
Yes
Conklin/Binghamton
Coalition. ..................... Broome
700e
19,000e
2008c
No
Schyuler County
Coalition. ..................... Schyuler
150c
10,000c
2009c
No
Tompkins County
Coalition. ..................... Tompkins
80+c
NDf
2010c
No
Southern Tier
Landowners
Tioga;
Coalition. .....................
Broome
NDf
NDf
2008c
No
*
NOTE: Lease signed as of February 01, 2011.
SOURCES: aSCLC 2010; bTCLG 2010; cInterview data; dWilber 2008; eBCLC
2010; fThis information has not been publically disclosed
Many landowner coalitions were on the verge of signing leases with energy
companies before the state environmental review and the recent economic decline.
As of early 2011, most have not yet signed group leases. This is attributed primarily
to the decrease in leasing interest, which is expected to be temporary. Much of the
groups’ strategy and true negotiating leverage has yet to be tested, although a few
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of the coalitions in New York have lucrative leases. It is widely expected that once
drilling is again allowed, leasing activity in New York will strongly rebound.
Membership in the coalitions is clearly reserved to property owners. However,
many coalitions currently have outreach efforts to the broader community.
Coalitions organize or sponsor educational seminars that are open to the public on
topics ranging from geology to forestry practices to financial literacy presented by
a range of municipal, state, academic, and energy company representatives. Dozens
of such sessions have been organized by landowner coalitions and serve as among
the most influential and comprehensive sources of education on Marcellus Shalerelated topics in communities throughout the Southern Tier. Coalition leaders have
often become community leaders that interact regularly with local politicians and
officials.
Political Advocacy
Another significant development is the recent creation of a statewide umbrella
group called the Joint Landowners Coalition of New York that includes the leaders
of many individual coalitions, created to share leasing information and negotiation
strategies, and for lobbying and advocacy at the state and federal government
levels. The group’s mission statement reads: “To foster, promote, advance and
protect the common interest of the people as it pertains to natural gas development
through education and best environmental practices” (JLCNY 2010). While this
group will not be signing leases for the totality of coalition acreages, it does serve
to aggregate existing human, political, and social capital resources and improve the
relative position of these groups. Lobbying and political outreach activities among
the coalitions have increased with the environmental review process: blue and green
yard signs that read “Friends of Natural Gas NY” have been distributed across the
Southern Tier by landowner coalitions, and some groups have helped to organize
public demonstrations with a coordinated message of “Pass Responsible Gas
Drilling” (which is often memorably summarized with the slogan “Pass Gas”).
There are members of the coalitions who have publicly avowed critical views of
federal or state government regulation. However, most coalitions appear – at least
publically – to favor non-confrontational rhetoric when advocating for the issuance
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of drilling permits.2 Further, the central focus and organizing force behind the
coalitions appears to remain related to collective lease negotiation.
The Timing of Group Formation
When questioned about the time line of the emergence of landowner coalitions
in southern New York State, eight of the interview subjects pointed toward a series
of educational presentations held by a handful of agricultural and extension
educators during a period between late 2007 and mid-2008, a time when energy
company representatives (or landmen) began to aggressively approach landowners
to sign energy leases. The purpose of those meetings was to offer information on
the leasing process, the process of drilling a natural gas well, and strategies for
individually negotiating a natural gas lease. Two organizers said they had been
aware of a few small-scale coalitions forming among landowners in Pennsylvania,
while others said the rationale to act collectively occurred spontaneously.
One educator interviewed for this study recalled,
We did a meeting down in Delaware County, and a meeting up in
Broome County, after getting some calls about landmen showing up.…It
took a while to realize that you could negotiate and that all your leverage
for the most part is your base of property.…It was more of a spontaneous
thing. I'm trying to think if the word coalition was even used. It was just the
idea of working in groups, with your direct neighbors, just for leverage in
negotiations. (Emerson)
It was out of these educational meetings that at least three landowner coalitions
were formed in the eastern end of the Southern Tier. In May of 2008, the Deposit,
NY coalition, comprised of about 300 landowners owning some 30,700 acres of land
in Broome and Delaware Counties, used their leverage to sign a 5-year lease with
XTO Energy for $2,411 per acre and a 15-percent royalty. By comparison, the
highest rate offered to individual landowners in that area at the time was
approximately $750 per acre and a 12.5-percent royalty, with most landowners
receiving much less (Wilber 2008). Many farmers in the Deposit area were literally
made millionaires overnight, and news of the deal spread.
2

As an example, a recent fund-raising letter from the president of the Joint Landowners

Coalition summarized the group’s advocacy efforts: “W e're the only statewide organization that is
reaching out to educate people and politicians about the benefits of gas and how it can be safely and
responsibly developed” (JLCNY 2011:1, emphasis in original).
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Motivations for Membership
It emerged from the interviews that financial incentive for members represented
the primary motivation among both members and organizers. This motive was
especially strong at the early stages of organization. A coalition organizer from an
area several counties away from the Deposit coalition recalled,
Here was a whole bunch of people, landowners, that were being offered
$50-75 an acre, but you started seeing $2500 an acre with the coalitions.
And so I thought, ‘Whoa, that's pretty significant.’ That’s how I got
involved.…I saw that, gee, this didn't make any sense that the gas
companies were not offering fair and equitable prices. So [in] June 2008, I
went out to [the local] firehouse and gave a little presentation to some
people out there [about starting a coalition]. (Hume)
Another organizer from a different coalition recalled,
I had saw a flier down at a tractor supply store that was announcing an
informational workshop down at the [town] auditorium. And by this time,
I believe the Deposit coalition, I think it was, had signed. So this was when
things really started getting heated up so it was really becoming the idea
that if land owners joined together, they could get a better deal.…And there
were quite a few people in that auditorium that night; there was probably
a couple hundred. And it was kind of, “Hey, I think we ought to get
together.” (Dell)
Soon thereafter, however, the combination of the update to the GEIS and
economic decline halted much of the leasing activity. Five of the interviewees
indicated that during this time, members expanded their motivations for collective
action to include the protection of private property and environmental protection.
One organizer noted,
So in the beginning it may have started as, “Let’s band together for
increased bargaining power.” But as it evolved, it became more of “Let’s
become knowledgeable. Let’s work together as a group. Let’s keep our
resources intact. Let’s keep our environment intact. Let’s make sure the
water is safe.” So it switched to a much more comprehensive purpose.
(Murphy)
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Another organizer added, “You can almost put money as number two, now. The
biggest thing is the protection of private assets and private property, and just the
knowledge. Not being taken advantage of and protecting yourself.” (Emerson)
An Emerging Emphasis on Property and Environmental Protection
The environmental protections negotiated by landowner coalitions have the
potential to influence natural resource management across vast acreages of New
York and thus the environmental public goods over what might occur if the leases
were negotiated separately. The leases signed with some coalitions require
environmental protections above those required by the New York State DEC
(Department of Environmental Conservation) regulations – such as additional
water testing; additional buffers from streams, wetlands, or structures; and more
stringent reclamation practices – and other coalitions have since investigated
additional management strategies that not only go beyond what is required by DEC
but include development practices more specifically tailored to the local
environment.
The DEC is going to have environmental regulations that will be a
minimum requirement. The lease that our groups have created is going to
be more restrictive and much more protective of the environment than
anything the DEC is doing….because the lease is a legal contract, the gas
companies are not going to have the option to choose less stringent
environmental regulations. If you acknowledge that drilling is going to
happen at some point, the reality is that there will be more environmental
protection by landowners getting involved in a coalition, because you have
more power to write a more stringent lease. (Dell)
A representative of the Deposit Coalition noted that property and
environmental protections included in their lease were critical to the members.
We have in there that, for example, there’s distances that they have to
stay away from all buildings, I think it’s a 500-ft additional buffer. They
have to come in and they have to check all the water systems within that
area, it's got to be tested before they drill. So if there’s any way that these
water supplies are harmed in any way, they're going to have to be prepared
to fix it. (Newcombe)
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Future Roles: “Rolling” Coalitions? Environmental Monitoring?
When asked to predict how the coalitions would operate or expand in the future,
especially after a lease is signed, three organizers cited the current mosaic of leased
and un-leased properties as a constant source of new members as leases expire in
the future.
We organized in the form of what we call a rolling coalition. We
actually have right now about 75,000 acres that is ready to be released.
“Open acreage,” we call it. Within the next year there will be an additional
8 or 10 thousand acres that the leases will run out on, and so on. So this will
be a rolling, or constant coalition and we don’t foresee any predetermined
time when we would end. (Noble)
When asked if they envisioned that the coalitions would help landowners
monitor drilling activities for environmental or other lease violations, all of the
organizers expected that the coalitions could do so, with scenarios ranging from the
issuance of monitoring guidelines to pro bono legal assistance. However, one
organizer floated within his or her coalition the idea of setting aside funds for longterm legal assistance, but it was deemed too complicated.
[We had the idea that] landowners put 3 percent back into a trust for
the group so that should future legal expenses arise, that that trust would
be there. But who manages it? How long does it last? Where does the
money go when it's done? And most importantly, your landowners don't
want to spend 3 percent of their money because right now it's not a
problem.…So not to say that it couldn't be done, but the landowners would
have to fund those trusts and manage them and your landowners are not
going to be willing to give up that money. (Jones)
However, even lacking a legal trust, the collective power of the landowner
coalitions to fight lease violations has already been demonstrated. For example,
letter-writing campaigns and lobbying efforts organized by the coalitions have
resulted in punitive actions by the New York State Attorney General against
energy companies for violating existing lease agreements with coalition members
(Wilber 2009). Besides lobbying state regulators, the coalitions distributed
information to their members on which common leasing violations to watch for,
cataloged reported violations, and provided legal advice on how to best respond to
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the violations. Upon the announcement of a widely-publicized legal settlement with
an energy company, a coalition representative was quoted in the newspaper as
stating “[T]his lets landowners know it is not a David-and-Goliath fight. It lets
gas companies know they will be watched, and they have to follow the same code
of ethics everybody else does” (Wilber 2009:1).
Membership and Benefits to Community
Coalition members were asked to explain whether and how the broader
community might benefit from the coalitions, and how communities might
potentially work with the coalitions to achieve benefits. Most respondents indicated
that they believe these communities will most certainly receive indirect benefits of
more local income and the cumulative environmental effect of better property
protections. However, the avenue by which communities or municipalities could
receive direct benefit was not well established. It appears that little is currently
being done to concretely address this aspect, suggesting that this element is being
recognized but remains yet-underdeveloped.
When the leasing boom first appeared in spring of 2008, everybody’s
immediate focus was on compensation. And nearly a year later other
concerns such as all the social and economic and the environmental and
legal issues kind of started to enter in to most landowners’ consciousness.
So we weren't just gonna be about giving better deals for our landowners,
and monitoring terms but we are looking to protect landowners and even
the non-leasor community members . . . trying to maximize capital on a lot
of the good things that could come from natural gas development, and
minimize the bad things. (Murphy)
Another coalition leader stated,
I don't think [negotiating benefits for the larger community are] being
contemplated yet by the landowner coalitions because the landowner
coalitions are made up entirely of private land owners.…The next logical
step in my opinion is for these [local government advisory] energy
taskforces that are also emerging across the Southern Tier should begin to
work together with landowner coalitions. The landowner coalitions would
certainly have the leverage and I think that’s where an energy taskforce
could provide valuable recommendations to a landowner coalition and to
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say, “Let’s try and get some of these additional things that are very common
in large scale energy projects.” If one little town is asking for a new
playground, it just depends how important that little town is. But if you've
got the whole county saying, “You ain't doing business in our
community…unless…”, it sounds a little bit like blackmailing, but there’s
going to be significant externalities that affect the whole community, so
beyond the tax assessment benefits and things that supposedly trickle down
and help the whole community, to me it seems very reasonable that if there
is going to be any kind of gas drilling in our community that there’s some
benefits done that compensate the whole community. (Carruthers)

Another coalition leader also mentioned impact mitigation techniques used in
other areas.
Government doesn’t typically lead the way that people think it does.
Most good ideas are going to come from another source, and it’s going to
be landowner coalitions who are going to be the ones that are going to show
the state, the feds in some instances, what should or shouldn’t be done.
People always go to town meetings and say they want the truck traffic to
diminish and the town can do very little about it – and this is even without
any gas drilling. I know there are pipeline systems that have been put into
place in heavily developed gas plays that pipe water in right next to the
pipelines that pipe the gas and this cuts down all the truck traffic. This is
absolutely something we could try [to negotiate]. We have these ideas- we
have been looking at development in Norway, and we know how it can be
done and we are looking at this in a global way. If the town, if the
county…once these problems and opportunities come we can begin to
brainstorm. (Francis)
One coalition organizer was less optimistic.
As far as working with the municipalities: as the landowner, do you
want to sit there and wait for the municipality to get what it wants?
Landowners are not going to sit there and wait. Most landowners you
would like to think are community-oriented, but how often do you think
about the shape and condition that your town's fire truck is in until you need
it? (Jones)
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Another coalition leader, while sympathetic, thought that negotiating for the
public at large was not pragmatic.
There is a pretty large universe of stakeholders that have greater and
smaller legitimate interests about how the development of the gas resource
is done. The process by which their interest is recognized and dealt with is
a pretty huge process, and I don’t think it would be fair to say that it is up
to a coalition to try to identify the whole world of stakeholders out there
and legitimate interests. I think this is a process that to some degree people
are going to have to speak up for themselves and there is some of this going
on right now. (Martin)
A leader very optimistic toward working with local government still admitted
that members will invariably have the most control over the organization:
Landowners are definitely going to be benevolent dictators in this
process. There is no doubt in my mind. Especially the large landowners,
which in this area is the farm community. Now whether they are mean or
benevolent in how they go about it is a different story. But to vilify
landowners for being interested in this is a grave error, because landowners
are the folks that will make this a successful process or not. (Francis)
Another leader was more optimistic.
You got to be aware that there is impact to the community. There's
positive impact with jobs, income, the turnover of income, the additional
people, all of that. But then someone is going to have to take responsibility
for the infrastructure, the roads, that kind of thing.…I think whichever
municipality that has the acreage, the coalition would be a partner with the
municipalities. What would be a good thing is that if we have
communication, an open link, and that we understand the impact to the local
community. (Hume)
A coalition leader explained that the groups can still do good things for the
community outside the lease negotiation process.
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We have a situation [nearby] where several wind turbines are being
proposed – they are trying to get venture capital together to finance the
construction. I have suggested to the wind developer that he approach these
landowner coalitions and make this pitch. If the plan is sound enough and
good enough, people as a group will invest in it – not because it is wind, but
because it is local, it’s energy, and it is a sound business idea. (Francis)

While to some extent the coalitions currently seek the collective management
of natural resources for the common good, the limit of that “commons” seems (for
now) to be bounded by the property boundaries of coalition members. The groups
are, however, building collective capacity by pooling information, skills, and other
forms of human capital that, before the consolidation, have been widely dispersed
across individual landowners, and they attempt to apply this to the management of
natural resources. Furthermore, they attempt to wrest the power away from the
centralized and non-local structures of the energy developer. In these elements,
there are some nascent impulses toward community outcomes.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Our paper has introduced the emergence and activities of the landowner
coalitions that have formed in the Southern Tier of New York State in response to
exploration of the natural gas resources of the Marcellus Shale, and we have
partially situated this phenomenon against other types of collective natural resource
management by analyzing the provision of member versus public benefits. These
coalitions have formed rapidly, have many members, and now influence a large
portion of the drillable landscape in the region. They have heretofore been
motivated by factors consistent with a cooperative framework, as they have
emphasized the securing of private, excludable, financial, environmental, and
property rights benefits for members. Barton (1989:1), in his introduction to the
cooperative model, noted that cooperatives in the United States are fundamentally
private organizations operating in a capitalistic private enterprise system, whereby
“benefits of the cooperative are distributed to its [members] on the basis of their
use.” The interviews with landowner coalition organizers show that the coalitions
in New York State are organized and managed in much the same way, with a
primary focus of maximizing the financial benefits from capitalistic enterprise to its
members, with an economic return based on the property contributed. Coalitions
that have signed collectively-negotiated leases have clearly demonstrated the
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economic value of doing so, and a clear and rational economic incentive for
membership exists.
Our interviews, however, also reveal that these coalitions are engaged in
discussions and strategies that may someday lead to the potential provision of
public benefits, either indirectly though the cumulative impact of member property
protections across landscape scales, or directly though large scale mitigation
strategies in realms such as waste disposal, community development, and structured
local economic investment.
The ecological, health, and land use protections – which thus far have included
items such as water testing, setback restrictions from waterways and built
structures, and reclamation protocols – negotiated for coalition members are private
goods at the individual level, but at the aggregate level they can become public
goods with implications for regional well-being. Interview data show that coalition
leaders are thinking about these benefits similarly: individual benefits are foremost,
but the larger cumulative effects on public benefits are also kept in mind.
Regarding the potential for reducing ecological damage, and in comparison to
a scenario of individually-negotiated leases such as is occurring in neighboring
states, the coalitions offer several opportunities for ecological benefits. First,
ecological benefit may take the form of individual landowners’ greater ability to
dictate the terms of unwanted land uses (e.g., the placement of roads away from
sensitive areas, reduction of permanent structures, materials handling and disposal
stipulations) and wanted land actions (e.g., reclamation protocols, reforesting
practices). Second, although these negotiations are conducted for individual
coalition members, the sheer scale of land controlled ensures that some modicum
of protection for relatively large blocks of rural landscape may result. Many
members of the community will presumably benefit from the protection of large
blocks of landscape, in both protection of cross-boundary ecosystems and other
natural resources, and protection of landscape-based community attributes. An
important component of this protection may take the form of ecological monitoring,
either through a legal trust or, more likely, through collective sharing of
information and lobbying (as has already occurred regarding other leasing
violations). A third, and thus far entirely hypothetical, possibility for ecological
benefit is the negotiation of common benefits by the landowner coalitions for the
larger community.
While this latter type of negotiation is just beginning to be considered by
coalition leaders, without municipal or regional governments’ ability to conduct
effective negotiations, the coalitions may represent the best and only option for this
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third scenario to unfold. Such a negotiation would presumably be much more
difficult, and it will be interesting to see whether coalition leaders and members are
ultimately willing to shoulder the burden to promote general well-being on a larger
scale. Research in other energy development areas has shown that, in general,
people show more concern with negative impacts as experience with energy
development increases (Anderson and Theodori 2009; Thompson and Blevins
1983). Likewise, experience with gas drilling in the Southern Tier may precipitate
coalition activity toward larger concerns.
Thus far these groups have also not yet engaged the larger socioeconomic wellbeing of the community, although there are clearly benefits to the community in the
form of increased compensation flowing through the local economy, especially when
alternative drilling scenarios are considered. Yet a prime concern about Marcellus
shale drilling involves the exacerbation of existing inequality: those with favorable
leasing terms stand to reap great financial gain when socioeconomic and municipal
infrastructure is stressed, a condition that has traditionally resulted in some
members of resource dependent communities being made worse off (Jacquet 2009).
A criticism sometimes leveled at the landowner coalitions is that they stand to
benefit by degrading the quality of life of non-land owners, yet local communities
now have a greater, if largely untested, potential to manage the development of
these resources than was previously available, especially if the alternative scenario
is widespread drilling that is individually negotiated. Interestingly, benefits from
collective organization may also flow to energy companies, as the coalitions offer
the companies lowered transaction costs through one-stop shopping; still, how
these lowered costs compare with coalition leasing terms that include vastly
increased rates of compensation and an array of additional demands seems unknown
amongst all parties.
Even in the wider multi-state Marcellus Shale policy arena that includes
academics and state regulators, socioeconomic impacts and community controls are
only just beginning to be discussed (Jacquet and Stedman 2009; Kenneally and
Mathes 2010 ). It may be unrealistic for coalitions to be “leading the pack” in this
realm, and their acts of collective action toward leasing negotiations still represent
some progressive changes to the organization and regulation of natural gas
development in the Marcellus Shale.
CONCLUSION
This study is limited in that it is focused on the experiences and opinions of
coalition leaders; a great deal of research opportunity exists to measure the
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attitudes of rank-and-file members and analyze the groups’ true capacity as they
begin to negotiate with energy companies. Nonetheless, the landowner coalitions
described here – especially given their impressive sizes and strength – have
demonstrated the value of working together and have gained sometimes substantial
increases in compensation, property-level environmental protections, and legal
power acquired for their members.
Substantially increased leasing bonuses and royalty rates for thousands of
landowners will undoubtedly create indirect benefits for local economies, and the
impact of thousands of parcel-scale ecological protections can have a positive
cumulative effect on public ecosystem services and amenities – especially when
compared with a similar amount of gas development occurring on individuallynegotiated properties.
It remains to be seen if the size and strength of the coalitions – combined with
a vacuum of municipal authority – will allow the groups to transcend localized
collective action and move toward the provision of public goods as more consistent
with a public-benefits framework such as CBRM. Much of the coalitions’ potential
in this regard is yet unrealized; however, the coalitions have demonstrated an
ability to expand the incentives of membership to engage non-monetary and
ecological benefits.
It remains to be seen how the wider coalition strategy (and the patience of
coalition members) will fare during protracted negotiations with energy companies.
Yet the collective action of individual landowners in New York State has shown
promise as an effective management tool for the extraction of natural gas and other
types of energy development taking hold across vast areas of small-acre parcels in
the United States.
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